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Power to the People: Data Citizens in
the Age of Precision Medicine
Barbara J. Evans*
ABSTRACT
Twentieth-century bioethics celebrated individual autonomy but
framed autonomy largely in terms of an individual's power to make
decisions and act alone. The most pressing challenges of big data science
in the twenty-first century can only be resolved through collective action
and common purpose. This Article surveys some of these challenges and
asks how common purpose can ever emerge on the present bioethical and
regulatory landscape. The solution may lie in embracing a broader
concept of autonomy that empowers individuals to protect their interests
by exercising meaningful rights of data citizenship. This Article argues
that twentieth-century bioethics was a paternalistic, top-down affair in
which self-proclaimed ethics experts set standards to protect research
subjects portrayed as autonomous yet too vulnerable and disorganized to
protect themselves. The time may be ripe for BioEXIT, a popular uprising
of regular people seeking a meaningful voice in establishing citizen-led
ethical and privacy standards to advance big-data science while
addressing the concerns people feel about the privacy of their health data.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 244
* Alumnae College Professor of Law and Director, Center for Biotechnology & Law,
University of Houston Law Center, bjevans@central.uh.edu. This work received financial support
from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation's Health Data Exploration Project (Kevin Patrick,
M.D., M.S., PI), http://hdexplore.calit2.net, with additional support from NIH/NHGRI/NCI
grants U01HG006507 (GPJ) and U01HG007307-02S2 (GPJ).
243
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
II. THE RISE AND IMPENDING FALL OF Go-IT-ALONE
AUTONOMY ................................... .... 247
III. EVOLVING CONCEPTS OF AUTONOMY............ ...... 251
IV. THE BEGINNINGS OF COMMON PURPOSE ................ 256




Very large datasets are the lifeblood of twenty-first century
informational research, which studies people virtually by reprocessing
their preexisting data.' The required datasets ideally should be highly
inclusive, containing data for tens or even hundreds of millions of
individualS2 to reduce selection bias and provide results relevant to all
population subgroups.3 These data resources also should be deeply
descriptive and capture diverse sources of data for each person
included in the dataset. Potentially useful data include, for example,
clinical data generated when people consume healthcare services
during spells of illness, research data collected when people volunteer
as research subjects, data describing wellness states-such as data
from fitness trackers and direct-to-consumer genetic testing services-
and data such as grocery store receipts that bear on lifestyle and
environmental exposures.
Linking these diverse data streams together to form a
longitudinal record for each person generally requires at least some
access to identifying information. There are algorithms that can link
incoming streams of data that have been de-identified by stripping
away overt identifiers such as names and patient numbers, but the
resulting linkages are probabilistic. Making sure that the linked data
all relate to the same person thus requires at least some identifiers, at
least temporarily, during the linkage process.4  This fact arouses
privacy concerns, as does the fact that the resulting longitudinal
1. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53,933,
53,938 (Sept. 8, 2015).
2. See generally Brian H. Shirts et al., Large Numbers of Individuals Are Required to
Classify and Define Risk for Rare Variants in Known Cancer Risk Genes, 16 GENETICS MED. 529,
529-34 (2014) (discussing the size of data resources required to draw inferences about the
clinical significance of rare genetic variants).
3. Barbara J. Evans, Barbarians at the Gate: Consumer-Driven Health Data Commons
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records may be re-identifiable. Even if overt identifiers are discarded
after the individual's data have been linked together to create a
longitudinal health record, there may be only one person in the world
for whom all of the parameters in the longitudinal record are a
match.5 The record itself is a unique identifier, like a health history
fingerprint. There may be only one person who fell off a skateboard
and cracked the upper right incisor at thirteen years, three months,
and six days of age, while giving birth to a healthy daughter at
twenty-six years, seven months, and eight days of age and developing
dementia prematurely at the age of fifty-three. Deeply descriptive
data display the irreproducibility of each of our life trajectories.
Americans are regularly admonished that access to our data is
crucial to projects like the Obama Administration's Precision Medicine
Initiative,6 Cancer Moonshot,7 and Brain Initiative.8 Implementing a
"learning health care system"9 and inferring the clinical significance of
human gene variants10 also require very large data resources.
Professors Faden, Kass, et al., note that the moral framework to
support such efforts "will depart in important respects from
contemporary conceptions of clinical and research ethics" and will
require a new "norm of common purpose . . . a principle presiding over
5. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2010) (noting that
personally identifiable information and non-identifiable information are no longer distinct
categories, given the potential for data to be re-identified); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of
Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1706
(2010) (discussing the potential for de-identified data to be re-identified); Mark A. Rothstein, Is
Deidentification Sufficient to Protect Health Privacy in Research?, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 5
(2010) ("Despite using various measures to deidentify health records, it is possible to reidentify
them in a surprisingly large number of cases.").
6. See The Precision Medicine Initiative, THE WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/precision-medicine [https://perma.cc[P4JF-NFSY] (last visited Nov.
16, 2016).
7. See Fact Sheet: Investing in the National Cancer Moonshot, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb.
1, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/01/fact-sheet-investing-national-
cancer-moonshot [https://perma.cc/8SV4-6QTU].
8. See The Brain Initiative, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/brain
[https://perma.cc/8S5T-9DXJ] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).
9. LEIGHANNE OLSEN ET AL., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, IOM ROUNDTABLE ON
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE, THE LEARNING HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 6 (LeighAnne Olsen et al. eds.,
2007).
10. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., USE OF DATABASES FOR ESTABLISHING THE CLINICAL
RELEVANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC VARIANTS 2 (2015), http://www.fda.gov/downloads
/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM467421.pdf [https://perma.cc/69M7-
464E]; see also Barbara J. Evans, Wylie Burke & Gail P. Jarvik, FDA and Genomic Tests: Getting
Regulation Right, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2258, 2260 (2015).
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matters that affect the interests of everyone . . . a shared social
purpose that we cannot as individuals achieve.""
This Article explores whether it is realistic to expect that
common purpose can emerge on the present bioethical and regulatory
landscape that celebrates individual autonomy. It reaches an
optimistic conclusion that common purpose may be achievable, but
only if we liberate the concept of autonomy from the narrow
straitjacket in which twentieth-century bioethics put it.
Twentieth-century bioethics embraced a Kantian, atomistic concept of
individual autonomy that portrays individuals as individualistic and
alone yet self-reliant in the sense of being able to protect their
interests through their own decision making.12 This concept
resembles Richard Fallon's "ascriptive" autonomy,13 which recognizes
each person's sovereignty over her moral choices. The atomistic
concept of autonomy is not the only way autonomy can be framed
and-this Article argues-it is an impoverished concept that threatens
to backfire in the setting of twenty-first-century informational
research because it disempowers the very people that bioethics aims to
protect. 14
The twentieth-century bioethics movement emphasized the
right of individuals to make their own choices through a right of
informed consent, as reflected in state medical practice statutes, in
hospital accreditation standards, and in privacy and research
regulations, such as the Common Rule,15 Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) human-subject protections,16 and the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy
Rule." A criticism of this framework is that it empowers individuals
to make decisions only as individuals and fails to equip them with
institutions for collective action and shared decision-making.1 8  It
conceives patients and research subjects as weak, vulnerable, alone,
disorganized, and in need of paternalistic protectors-for example,
11. Ruth R. Faden et al., An Ethics Framework for a Learning Health Care System: A
Departure from Traditional Research Ethics and Clinical Ethics, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S16,
S16 (2013).
12. ALFRED I. TAUBER, PATIENT AUTONOMY AND THE ETHICS OF RESPONSIBILITY 117
(2005).
13. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 890-93
(1994).
14. See id. at 875; see also Evans, supra note 3, at 28.
15. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2016).
16. 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.20, 56.101 (2016).
17. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in §§ 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C, 29 U.S.C, 42 U.S.C.); see also
Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2010).
18. Evans, supra note 3, at 26.
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ethicists and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs). Individuals are cast
as cowering "subjects," too disempowered to negotiate the ethical and
privacy protections they desire. There is a striking disconnect
between empirical surveys that show most people-up to eighty
percent of Americans-feel favorably about letting researchers use
their data1 9 and the low rates at which people actually consent for
their data to be used. Existing ethical and privacy regulations,
designed with little direct, organized, collective public engagement,
apparently fail to reassure people that it is safe to contribute their
data.
Regulations like the Common Rule and HIPAA Privacy Rule
reject the approach of organizing and empowering individuals to
protect themselves, for example, by unionizing research subjects to
defend their own interests through collective bargaining. This
approach has worked well in certain other contexts-labor relations,
for example-where law seeks to protect vulnerable individuals who
face disparities in bargaining power. Autonomy, in this setting, is not
the autonomy of the hapless, go-it-alone individual. It is the
autonomy of self-governing data citizens whose autonomy
encompasses a power to bind themselves to collective ventures that
afford stronger protection than one person, alone, can achieve.
II. THE RISE AND IMPENDING FALL OF Go-IT-ALONE AUTONOMY
At its inception in the mid-twentieth century, the field of
bioethics sought to protect the rights of individuals facing binary, us-
versus-them challenges: the patient against the physician in a
paternalistic health-care system20 or the scientifically naive human
research subject against the more sophisticated investigator in clinical
research settings. The Kantian, atomistic concept of autonomy was a
19. COMM. ON HEALTH RESEARCH AND THE PRIVACY OF HEALTH INFO.: THE HIPAA
PRIVACY RULE, INST. OF MED., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY,
IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 209-14 (Sharyl J. Nass, Laura A. Levit & Lawrence 0.
Gostin eds., 2009) [hereinafter IOM, PRIVACY REPORT] ("[A] majority of consumers are positive
about health research and, if asked in general terms, support their medical information being
made available for research."); see also HEALTH DATA EXPLORATION PROJECT, PERSONAL HEALTH
DATA FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD: NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO ENRICH UNDERSTANDING OF INDIVIDUAL
AND POPULATION HEALTH 13 (2014), http://hdexplore.calit2.net/wp-content/uploads/2015
/08/hdx final-report small.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XRH-5JKQ] (discussing individuals'
willingness to participate in research in the context of data from mobile and wearable devices);
Leonard J. Kish & Eric J. Topol, Unpatients-Why Patients Should Own Their Medical Data, 33
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 921, 923 (2015) (discussing individuals' willingness to participate in
research); Eric J. Topol, The Big Medical Data Miss: Challenges in Establishing an Open Medical
Resource, 16 NATURE REV. GENETICS 253, 254 (2015) (same).
20. See TAUBER, supra note 12, at 14-15.
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"powerful antidote to the threats to personhood that result"2 1 in these
David-versus-Goliath settings where there are disparities in expertise
and bargaining power. Individual informed consent has, however,
been criticized as a weak way to protect the autonomy of people whose
data are used in research.22 People may grant access to their data too
casually and, having done so, cede control over subsequent uses of
their data. Regulations like the Common Rule rely heavily on
informed consent while neglecting data security requirements and
other practical measures to manage privacy risks in an informational
setting.23 Informed consent, as traditionally conceived, gives people a
take-it-or-leave-it right to refuse to let their data be used in research if
they dislike the research protocol or distrust the privacy and ethical
protections that others have set for them.24 Even this modest right to
refuse can be waived by an IRB,2 5 usually staffed by employees of the
institutions that wish to use or share the people's data, and whom the
people never elected to represent heir interests.2 6
In response to criticisms of the informed consent framework,
there has been a recurring ddja vu of calls for individual data
ownership-often based on a fairy tale27 notion that legal property
ownership would empower people to veto2 8 unwanted uses of their
data and render the individual immune to countervailing public
interests in data access. Jacqueline Lipton usefully points out that
legal ownership, in reality, supplies a bundle of rights, limitations on
the rights, and duties,29 so that data ownership would not confer the
degree of control many of its proponents desire. Earlier works by
EvanS30 have explored problems with individual data ownership and
21. Id. at 14.
22. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, Protecting Privacy in Health Research: The Limits of
Individual Choice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1765, 1797 (2010) ("Consent requirements [imposed by the
HIPAA Privacy Rule] not only impede health research, but may actually undermine privacy
interests.").
23. Id. at 1773.
24. See Evans, supra note 3, at 8.
25. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2016) (HIPAA waiver provision); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (2016)
(Common Rule waiver provision).
26. See Carl H. Coleman, Rationalizing Risk Assessment in Human Subject Research,
46 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2004).
27. Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper
Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 804 (2004) (citing Jessica Litman,
Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1297-98 (2000)).
28. See, e.g., Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as
Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 26-41 (1996).
29. Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L.
Rev. 135, 173 (2004).
30. See Evans, supra note 3, at 11-16 (discussing problems with the metaphor of
individual data ownership); see also Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25
248 [Vol. XIX:2:243
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this essay resists the temptation to re-plow that old ground. Two
points, however, are relevant to this discussion.
First, many parties other than the individual have legitimate
interests in a person's health data. These include, for example, the
physician whose intellectual effort generated diagnostic information
contained in a patient's medical record; care providers that need
copies of patients' data to defend themselves from malpractice claims;
clinics and laboratories that are required by law to maintain copies of
patients' records and test results; and insurers that must maintain
records for auditing, regulatory, and fraud prevention purposes.31
Legal ownership of health data, if it existed, would necessarily be non-
exclusive,32 perhaps resembling the shared ownership frameworks
Ostrom and Schlager described in natural resource settings.33 In
shared ownership schemes, the individual does not enjoy "sole and
despotic dominion"34 of the resource, but instead has various
entitlements such as rights of access and use and a voice in collective
governance of the resource.
The second, and more fundamental, point is that proposals for
individual data ownership "double down" on the same atomistic vision
of autonomy that animated twentieth-century informed consent
requirements. Their underlying premise is that people, acting alone,
can effectively protect their own interests-a questionable premise, as
discussed below. Proponents of individual data ownership aspire to
endow individuals with a bigger club with which to defend their own
interests. The flaw is that individual self-defense-whether with a
consent right or with an ownership right-may not suffice as a way to
protect against the privacy risks that lurk in the twenty-first-century
data environment.
As noted, the most valuable data resources for big-data
research are deeply descriptive in the sense of linking, for each
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69, 77-82 (2012) (explaining why individual data ownership would not afford
protections superior to those patients already have under existing federal regulations).
31. Evans, supra note 3, at 16.
32. Id.
33. Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources:
A Conceptual Analysis, 68 LAND ECON. 249, 250-51 (1992) (describing entitlements of shared
ownership of fisheries and other natural resources, including: (1) "operational-level" entitlements
(e.g., a right to gain access to the resource and to withdraw products, such as a right to catch
fish) and (2) "collective-choice" rights (e.g., a right of management including the right to
participate in decisions about resource uses; a right to improve or transform the resource; a right
of exclusion, including the right to participate in decisions about who can access and use the
resource and decisions about the appropriate process for approving and enforcing access and use;
and a right of alienation that allows the above rights to be transferred to other people)).
34. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2, http://lonang.com/library
/reference/blackstone-commentaries-law-england/bla-20 1/ [https://perma.cc/B5SP-JUSU] (where
spelling conforms to modern conventions).
2016] 249
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included individual, multiple streams of personal health data. Such
data resources can potentially be re-identified by cross-correlating
data elements with external datasets that link those same elements
back to the person's name or other unique identifiers.35 However,
re-identification risk is not the only threat to individual privacy. An
even more perplexing problem in modern, interconnected big-data
environments is privacy interdependence: individuals' privacy is
"affected by the decisions of others, and could be out of their own
control."36
Privacy interdependence is familiar in online social networks:
Person A chooses to share a group photo that displays an
embarrassing image of Person B, which the latter would prefer to
suppress.37 Particularly with genomic data, which display similarities
among related individuals, one family member's willingness to share
data in identifiable form may reveal information about others who did
not consent to data sharing. When people's privacy preferences are
misaligned and some of the people reveal even a limited set of
attributes, "it is almost impossible for a specific user to hide in the
crowd."38 Moving past petty traditional conceptions of clan and
kinship, we are all one big human family, sharing genomic data that is
99.9% alike and even sharing weight gains within our social
networks.39 Even when familial interrelationships are not an issue,
data scientists have demonstrated re-identification attacks that can
infer-sometimes with surprisingly high probabilities-who a given
genome belongs to, by applying algorithms that rule out identifiable
individuals that the data could not possibly belong to.40 Thus, if my
35. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 5, at 19-22 (warning that the distinction
between personally identifiable information and non-identifiable information is increasingly
irrelevant in light of the potential for data to be re-identified); Ohm, supra note 5, at 1706-07
(discussing the risks to individual privacy if de-identified data were to be re-identified);
Rothstein, supra note 5, at 5 ("Despite using various measures to deidentify health records, it is
possible to reidentify them in a surprisingly large number of cases . . . ."); Khaled El Emam,
Elizabeth Jonker, Luk Arbuckle & Bradley Malin, A Systematic Review of Re-Identification
Attacks on Health Data, PLOS ONE (Dec. 2, 2011), http://journals.plos.org
/plosone/article?id=10. 1371/journal.pone.0028071 [https://perma.cc/2C8Z-FJHK].
36. GERGELY BICZ6K & PERN Hui CHIA, INTERDEPENDENT PRIVACY: LET ME SHARE
YOUR DATA 1 (2013), http://fcl3.ifca.ai/proc/10-1.pdf [https://perma.cclWWP2-9VC8].
37. MATHIAS HUMBERT, WHEN OTHERS IMPINGE UPON YOUR PRIVACY: INTERDEPENDENT
RISKS AND PROTECTION IN A CONNECTED WORLD 66 (2015), https://infoscience.epfl.ch
/record/205089/files/EPFLTH6515.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JBL-4XUS].
38. Id. at v.
39. Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social
Network Over 32 Years, 2007 NEW ENG. J. MED. 357, 371 (2007).
40. Arvind Narayanan, Assistant Professor of Comput. Sci., Princeton Univ., New
Genetic Re-Identification Methods and Implications for Privacy, Presentation at Big Data: Policy
Meets Data Science (Oct. 15, 2015).
250 [Vol. XIX:2:243
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neighbor shares her genome in identifiable format, her decision to do
so raises the odds that my genomic information can be linked to me.
Faced with privacy interdependence, the individual's
autonomous right of consent no longer suffices to protect individual
privacy. To protect one person's privacy, it might be necessary to
constrain other people's rights to consent to sharing of their own data.
In effect, respecting one person's autonomy would require limiting the
autonomy of others. Atomistic, autonomous decision making breaks
down as a way to advance individual interests.
This critique differs starkly from the oft-heard criticism that
individual decisions fail to advance the public interest (for example, by
making it impossible to assemble data resources that could be used to
advance public health and the wellbeing of other patients). This latter
critique-that atomistic autonomy undermines public interests-has
never proved persuasive among strong proponents of individual data
privacy, who may view autonomy as encompassing a right to make
decisions harmful to others. In contrast, the critique grounded in,
privacy interdependence highlights an altogether different
problem: individuals cannot, through their own autonomous decision
making, protect their own interests anymore. No person is an island
in the environment of big data. Insistence on atomistic autonomy
disempowers individuals, if the problems they face require collective
action.
III. EVOLVING CONCEPTS OF AUTONOMY
In the years since 1980, some bioethicists have explored
alternative visions of what individual autonomy means, such as an
interactive or relational41 view where autonomy is "not merely an
internal, psychological characteristic but also an external, or social"
one.42 By this view, individuals enhance their autonomy by working
together rather than by acting alone.43 A simple example is that an
individual's desire to think boldly and independently may best be
served by affiliating with a bureaucratic, conformist university that
has excellent libraries and research facilities. The "self is understood
as a confluence of relationships and social obligations that are
constitutive of identity" and autonomy may, at times, "legitimately be
subordinated to other moral principles that determine how the self is
41. See, e.g., TAUBER, supra note 12, at 121.
42. Id. at 120 (citing GRACE CLEMENT, CARE, AUTONOMY, AND JUSTICE: FEMINISM AND
THE ETHIC OF CARE 22 (1996)).
43. Id. at 122.
2016] 251
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governed within a social context."44  As individuals, people are
autonomous yet they are simultaneously embedded in social
relationships and shared institutions, and these are instrumental to
the realization of individual autonomy. Individuals acting alone are
weak; individuals acting together are stronger. Social institutions are
soil out of which common purpose can emerge. These views were mere
eddies and side currents in twentieth-century bioethics.
Insistence on atomistic autonomy, when discussing data access,
has had the unintended consequence of keeping individuals
disorganized and, therefore, weak. Those who assert a right of
individuals to block access to their data in all circumstances-even
when other people's health depends on data access-run a risk of
blurring the line between individual autonomy and narcissism, "a
pattern of traits and behaviors, which signify infatuation and
obsession with one's self to the exclusion of all others and the egotistic
and ruthless pursuit of one's gratification, dominance and ambition."45
One sometimes hears that even if research has high social value and
consent is difficult or impossible to obtain, and even if requiring
consent may undercut the scientific validity of results, these problems
"do not in themselves constitute valid ethical reasons for waiving a
requirement of informed consent."46 Such views consign individuals to
the condition Thomas Hobbes referred to as "the confusion of a
disunited multitude," 47 unable to act together for the common purpose
of promoting wellness and public health and also, in a time of privacy
interdependence, unable to mount a unified response to shared
threats.
In Hobbes's scheme, these confused, disunited people are
empowered when they come together to form "commonwealths,"
institutions they create to advance common purposes. When forming
a commonwealth, people agree "every one with every one" to create
mechanisms for deliberating and making collective decisions that bind
all of them: "every one, as well he that voted for it as he that voted
against it" shall embrace decisions made by the "consent of the people
assembled . . . in the same manner as if they were his own."4 8
Governance, "in the sense of binding collective decisions about
public affairs[,]" is one of a basic set of universal concepts that
44. Id. at 85.
45. See Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) Definition, HEALTHY PLACE,
http://www.healthyplace.com/personality-disorders/malignant-self-love/narcissistic-personality-
disorder-npd-definition [https://perma.cc/3PBV-YCXZ] (last visited Dec. 29, 2016).
46. Franklin G. Miller, Research on Medical Records Without Informed Consent, 36 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 560, 560 (2008) (discussing but not necessarily espousing this view).
47. THoMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 101 (1651).
48. Id.
[Vol. XIX:2:243252
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anthropologists observe in both primitive and advanced cultures;
other such concepts include giving, lending, reciprocating, and forming
coalitions.4 9  This core concept was poorly developed in twentieth-
century bioethics.
In 2015, the White House Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI)
finalized a set of Privacy and Trust Principles50 addressing governance
of the one-million-person PMI cohort, which aims to assemble
genomic, clinical, and other sources of data on individuals who
volunteer as research participants. These state, as the first principle:
"Governance should include substantive participant representation at
all levels of program oversight, design, implementation, and
evaluation."5 1 The second principle is that governance "should create
and maintain active collaborations among participants, researchers,
healthcare providers, the Federal Government, and other
stakeholders."52
These principles reflect movement toward a new norm of
treating people whose data are used in research as active participants
whose engagement extends beyond the moment they sign an informed
consent document. Kelty et al., in their recent meta-analysiS53 of what
participation means in modern informational research and design
practice, describe a tendency to treat participation as unidimensional
and to "cherry pick one aspect of participation and substitute it for the
whole."5 4 In regulations like the Common Rule and HIPAA Privacy
Rule, the right of informed consent was the lone "cherry" for patients
and research subjects.
Meaningful participation, according to Kelty and his
colleagues, engages people along seven distinct dimensions:
(1) Participants receive an educative dividend-they learn
something or somehow gain skills or become better people
by participating.
49. Stuart P. Green, The Universal Grammar of Criminal Law: Basic Concepts of
Criminal Law by George P. Fletcher, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2104, 2112 (2000) (citing DONALD E.
BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS (1991)); see also Robin Bradley Kar, The Deep Structure of Law and
Morality, 84 TEX. L. REV. 877, 885 (2006) (citing DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS (1991)).






53. Christopher Kelty et al., Seven Dimensions of Contemporary Participation
Disentangled, 66 J. ASS'N INFO. SCl. & TECH. 474, 476-77 (2015).
54. Id. at 475.
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(2) They are involved in decision-making and goal-setting and
are not merely instrumental to completion of a task by
others.
(3) They have "control or ownership of the resources produced
by participation."55 The italics have been added to
emphasize that this statement relates to the outputs rather
than the inputs of participation. Simply owning the data
one contributes as an input to research would not satisfy
this requirement.
(4) Participation is voluntary and participants have the
capacity to exit.
(5) They have an effective voice.
(6) The effectiveness of participation is evaluated using
metrics.
(7) There is a "collective, affective"56  experience of
participating-people feel they are part of something
greater than themselves.
If this is what it means for individuals to "participate" in
research that uses their data, then twentieth-century regulations like
the Common Rule and the HIPAA Privacy Rule fall short of it. The
regulations give people a rebuttable right of informed consent and a
limited right to withdraw their data from research after they consent,
consistent with Item 4 in the above list. As for the other dimensions of
research participation, a telling example is the immense efforts over
the past twenty-five years by Internal Review Boards (IRBs) operating
under the Common Rule, regulators, and bioethicists to restrict
people's access to their own individual research findings, lest research
participants should suffer psycho-social or other harms from learning
through their participation in research.5 7 So much for the "educative
dividend" of Item 1. There is concern that research subjects are too
unsophisticated, vulnerable, and susceptible to fear to benefit from
education.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 483-84.
57. See Barbara J. Evans, The First Amendment Right to Speak About the Human
Genome, 16 PENN. J. CONST. L. 549, 577-83 (2014) (summarizing bioethical literature that
recommends against allowing research participants to have access to data about themselves
generated in research settings).
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The PMI Privacy and Trust Principles seem to offer a new
approach. Yet much depends on what the word "substantive" means
in the first principle ("Governance should include substantive
participant representation. ."). Does this merely mean more-than-
token representation-that is, more than the lone community
representative that the Common Rule requires on an IRB?
Alternatively, does it mean that the people whose data are used in
research will be given a genuine voice in deciding which uses of their
data are worthwhile and what the privacy, data security protections,
and terms of use should be? The mention of "substantive
representation" calls to mind the contrast between descriptive
representation and substantive representation in Hanna Pitkin's work
on meaningful representation.5 8  For example, descriptive
representation of women would involve having women serve in
Congress, and thus it has a potential for tokenism. Substantive
representation, on the other hand, would involve having
representatives-of whatever gender-focus on issues of concern to
women. A key question with the PMI Privacy and Trust Principles is
whether they will go beyond token or symbolic involvement of
research participants in governance bodies and focus governance on
the issues that concern people when their data are used in
informational research.
The preamble to the Privacy and Trust Principles is not
altogether encouraging on this score. It recounts that the principles
were developed "by an interagency working group that was co-led by
the White House Office of Science Technology Policy, the Department
of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights, and the
National Institutes of Health."59 The principles were "informed by a
series of expert roundtables, review of the bioethics literature, an
analysis of privacy policies and frameworks used by existing biobanks
and large cohorts"60-seemingly a top-down, expert- and scholar-led
pursuit of bioethical orthodoxy. Where were the people as the issues
were defined? They were allowed to give "comments from the public,"
but only after the main contours of the principles already had been
drafted. The people need to be engaged in data-system governance
from the beginning, not just at the end.
Moreover, some of the Privacy and Trust Principles amplify
these concerns. For example, the Principles state: "Communications
58. See generally Karen Celis & Sarah Childs, Introduction: The Descriptive and
Substantive Representation of Women: New Directions, 61 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 419 (2008)
(citing Hanna Pitkin and discussing the concept of substantive representation).
59. See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 50, at 1.
60. Id.
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with participants should be overseen centrally in order to ensure
consistent and responsible engagement."61  The notion that
responsible public engagement requires central controls over the free
flow of information is somewhat disquieting if this means that
unelected IRBs will continue to block participants' access to
information about themselves for the participants' own good. There is
hope, but it remains far from clear, that the Privacy and Trust
Principles mark a real departure from the top-down bioethics of the
past.
IV. THE BEGINNINGS OF COMMON PURPOSE
It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which self-serving
individuals, endowed with the right to make autonomous decisions
that serve their own perceived best interests, would willingly
surrender that right in favor of a norm of common purpose. One
possible scenario is that self-serving people may be willing to eschew
go-it-alone individualism if it ceases to promote their own personal
aims. This section argues that, in big data environments, traditional
norms of individual informed consent are not capable of serving the
principal aim for which they were designed: that is, empowering
individuals to protect themselves against research-related risks.
These traditional informed consent norms of the Common Rule
and HIPAA Privacy Rule were designed several decades ago for
clinical research and for small-data studies of the past.62 In those
contexts, individual informed consent is a rather effective instrument
for protecting people from research-related risks. A person can
effectively avoid the physical risks of clinical research by refusing to
consent to the research. Such refusals are strongly respected in our
legal system, which treats unconsented touching of a person's body as
a battery. Only in rare circumstances, such as emergency clinical
research where participants are not able to consent, can their right of
consent be waived, and then only under the oversight of an IRB.
In informational research that uses a person's data, the
principal risks individuals face are privacy and dignitary risks
associated with data disclosure. At least in the past, a right of
informed consent gave individuals considerable power to manage their
privacy risks. The degree of privacy risk people faced, it was thought,
was proportional to how widely they chose to share their data. The
Common Rule and HIPAA Privacy Rule do allow some unconsented
uses of data in research, but only subject to constraints: for example,
61. Id. at 2.
62. See Evans, supra note 3, at 8-9 (discussing history of these regulations).
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requiring data to be de-identified (which was thought to neutralize
privacy risks), or requiring a consent waiver (which requires an IRB or
Privacy Board to assess the privacy risks and judge them to be
minimal).63 In twentieth-century data environments, the consent
norms embodied in current regulations plausibly advanced
individuals' desire to be protected from privacy risks.
These assumptions grow weak in the modern big data
environment, where cross-correlation among multiple datasets allows
re-identification and where individuals' privacy risks are
interdependent. This environment thus offers two incentives for
people to band together to pursue common purposes. The first
incentive is the one that Professors Faden, Kass, and their
collaborators highlight: sharing individual health data offers a
prospect of public health benefits, and it may improve the health of
other people, such that the balance of individual and public interests
justifies a moral obligation to share one's own data.64 The second
incentive is more self-serving: individuals, acting alone, may no longer
be able to protect the privacy of their own health data. Collective
action of many individuals will be required, even to serve one's own
selfish aims. This latter point may turn out to be the more compelling
rationale for collective action in the age of big data. It is possible that
some people value their individual autonomy so greatly that they
would be willing to let other people die to protect their own data
privacy. Such people, while unwilling to work with other people to
pursue public health objectives, may nevertheless be willing to
cooperate with other people if that is the only way to protect
individual privacy. In the age of big data, public health and privacy
both are collective enterprises.
Common purpose requires civic solidarity. Richard Rorty has
reflected on the long struggle, dating back at least as far as the Greek
philosophers, to reconcile individual autonomy with membership in a
community.65  There is an obvious potential for autonomy to
undermine solidarity. Some thinkers view solidarity as flowing from
metaphysical principles-religious or ethical-that link the interests
of individuals to the good of the community; others portray solidarity
as more accidental, a product of socialization and historical
circumstances.6 6  The ultimate origins of solidarity and common
purpose are fortunately not essential to this discussion. It is essential,
63. See id. at 7 (summarizing nonconsensual access under the Privacy Rule and
Common Rule).
64. Faden et al., supra note 11, at 24.
65. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY xiii (1989).
66. Id.
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however, to admit that people are deeply divided about the privacy,
ethical, and moral issues in bioethics,67 making solidarity difficult, if
not impossible, to achieve.
Some people desire near-absolute control over their health
data, while others would like to see everybody's data openly accessible
for research and other projects perceived to advance the public good.
These differences are deep and intractable and cannot be resolved
through persuasion, because the disputants lack a shared set of
principles-and sometimes even a common set of perceived facts-by
which to judge whose view is correct. They are "moral strangers" to
one another, to use Engelhardt's phrase about the perils of bioethical
discourse.68 Deliberation is circular: my religion is correct because its
scriptures say so. Disputants must either agree to disagree or else
impose their views by force, by lobbying Congress, or otherwise
maneuvering to control the direction of policy.6 9 Solidarity cannot be
achieved by sitting down and talking about it.
In the absence of common purpose, will it be possible to
assemble the vast data resources that twenty-first-century science
requires? Under existing regulations, future access to data looks
highly problematic. A detailed analysis elsewhereo reached the
following conclusions: de-identification, which has been a major
pathway for research data access in the past, draws increasing
skepticism; re-identification risks are real. Even if de-identification
worked, de-identified data have limited scientific utility because they
cannot be linked together to form the deeply descriptive individual
health records most useful to science. Waivers of consent and privacy
authorization have been another important way to free data for
research but they, too, are increasingly problematic. How can IRB
members, in good conscience, deem the privacy risks of big, deeply
descriptive, general-purpose data resources to be minimal, as waiver
criteria require? Individual consent may be the only remaining
regulatory pathway for obtaining access to data resources. Yet, even
today, individuals do not consent to share their data in the numbers
that would be required in order to assemble the very large-scale,
inclusive data resources that twenty-first-century science needs. They
may grow even more reluctant to consent in coming years amid
growing public awareness of re-identification risks and privacy
interdependencies.
67. See H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 3-7 (2d ed. 1996).
68. Id. at 7.
69. RORTY, supra note 65, at 73.
70. See Evans, supra note 3, at 17-24 (evaluating various pathways for assembling
large-scale data resources under existing federal regulations).
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Two approaches have been proposed (and, in various contexts,
implemented) to address future data access problems. These two
approaches are worth highlighting because they mark opposite ends of
a spectrum that, at one end, maximizes the power of autonomous
individual decision-makers and, at the other end, imposes compulsory
data sharing to promote public good.
The first approach facilitates creation of personally controlled
health records, to be shared according to individual consent.n
Individuals or their designated agents, such as a commercial data
management company, would obtain copies of their own health
information-for example, by exercising the individuals' access rights
under Section 164.524 of the HIPAA Privacy Rule72-and assemble
these data into comprehensive individual health records. Individuals
could then specify, in granular detail, the particular data uses
acceptable to each individual. By accessing individuals' data in
accordance with their declared privacy and consent preferences, multi-
person data resources could be assembled on the basis of informed
consent.
The opposite extreme is to enact legislation requiring
compulsory data access to create large-scale data resources in the
public domain73-for example, by requiring entities that hold data to
supply it for specific public health, scientific, or regulatory uses.
These data resources would be openly available for use by a
designated group of qualified entities, such as public health officials or
biomedical researchers, that are legally authorized to use data on the
public's behalf.
71. See Mark A. Hall & Kevin A. Schulman, Ownership of Medical Information, 301
JAMA 1282, 1283-84 (2009) (discussing advantages of patient-controlled longitudinal health
records and suggesting that one way to foster the development of such records would be to "give
patients the rights to sell access to their records, rights that are superior to the property rights
held by [entities that currently hold patients' data]"); see also Kelly Caine & Rima Hanania,
Patients Want Granular Control over Health Information in Electronic Medical Records, J. AM.
MED. INFORMATICS Assoc. 0, 1-9 (2012); Mark A. Hall, Property, Privacy, and the Pursuit of
Interconnected Electronic Medical Records, 95 IOWA L. REV. 631, 651 (2010) ("[I]f patients were
given ownership of their complete medical treatment and health histories, they could license to
compilers their rights to that information in a propertized form that could be more fully
developed and commercialized."); Eric M. Meslin & Peter H. Schwartz, How Bioethics Principles
Can Aid Design of Electronic Health Records to Accommodate Patient Granular Control, 30 J.
GEN. INTERNAL MED. S3, S3-S6 (2015) (discussing granular consent).
72. See Individuals' Right Under HIPAA to Access their Health Information 45 CFR §
164.524, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/access/
[https://perma.cc/S2JU-U9SY] (last visited Jan. 3, 2017); Questions and Answers About HIPAA's
Access Right, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/access
/#newlyreleasedfaqs [https://perma.cc/5ZJF-9YKZ] (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
73. See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Data: Property, Privacy & the Public Interest, 36
AM. J.L. & MED. 586, 593 (2010).
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Both approaches have limitations. The first can create useful
data resources, yet its reliance on individual consent limits its
potential to produce highly inclusive datasets that capture rare events
(for example, rare genetic variants or unusual responses to specific
therapies). Rare events are of great scientific interest in some
contexts, including precision medicine, which by definition focuses on
individual rather than average group characteristics. Studying rare
events often requires vast datasets reflecting large samples of the
population, and it sometimes requires datasets free of consent bias
(selection bias).74 At the opposite extreme, compulsory data access
solves these problems but is ethically repugnant to many people.
Moreover, it is fraught with practical and legal complexities that
cause legislatures to reject this approach except in narrow situations
where data are necessary to serve a compelling public health need
(such as tracking epidemics and reporting child abuse).75 Compulsory
data access has never been-and probably never will be-embraced as
a general solution to the problem of making data available for
research.
Neither of the two extremes discussed fully resolves the
problem of data access. Intermediate options are needed-options in
the middle ground between individual, granular consent and
compulsory data access. The Common Rule and HIPAA Privacy Rule
implement intermediate options by allowing institutional data holders
(such as hospitals, insurers, and research organizations) to override
individual consent in specific circumstances-for example, if data are
de-identified or released pursuant to an IRB-approved waiver. These
intermediate solutions have always been controversial and, as noted,
they seem doomed to fail completely in the near future. New
intermediate options are needed at this time. The question is how to
develop them.
V. CREATING LABORATORIES TO SEARCH FOR COMMON PURPOSE
One of the most questionable aspects of twentieth-century
bioethics was its presumption that ethical and privacy standards
governing research data access should be developed "top down"-by
National Commissions, a Privacy Protection Study Commission,
expert advisory bodies, or federal agency officials-rather than
74. Evans, supra note 30, at 95-96; see also IOM, PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 19, at
209-14 (surveying studies of consent and selection bias); Brian Buckley et al., Selection Bias
Resulting from the Requirement for Prior Consent in Observational Research: A Community
Cohort of People with Ischaemic Heart Disease, 93 HEART 1116, 1116 (2007).
75. See Evans, supra note 30, at 102-03 (discussing practical and legal problems);
Evans, supra note 3, at 22-23 (same).
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"bottom up" through collective decisions of the people whose data
researchers wish to use. In normative ethics (the study of what
constitutes an ethical course of action), experts "disagree so much and
so radically that we hesitate to say that they are experts."76 Courts
consider normative ethics so standardless and nonreproduceable that
there is ongoing controversy whether normative ethics testimony even
meets the threshold for admissibility as legal evidence.77
Government-appointed expert advisory bodies add value in
fields-such as setting consumer product safety standards and water
quality standards-where recognizable bodies of expert knowledge
exist. But when answering the question, "What is an ethical use of an
individual's personal health data?" meaningful public engagement
offers expertise as credible as that of self-declared ethics experts. The
"top-down" approach to setting ethical standards for data access may,
however, reflect a pragmatic assessment hat the people, if asked,
would never be able to agree what the standards should be.
Policymakers may simply have deemed civic solidarity to be
impossible.
A mistake we may all be making is to assume that public
engagement is fruitful only if there is a prospect that a broad public
consensus will emerge. Too often, we assume that the public will
never agree on appropriate ethics and privacy standards to govern
data access, and the perceived intractability of their disagreement
becomes an excuse to cut them out of the debate. The real mistake
here lies in presuming that everyone needs to agree on a single set of
uniform access and privacy standards, applicable to all, in order for
data access to work. The reality may be that a vibrant framework of
research data access can exist in the presence of multiple, competing
visions of what ethical data access requires. If big data is as big as it
purports to be, perhaps it is big enough to accommodate a
"marketplace" of ethics and privacy standards.
Top-down ethical and privacy standards, such as those
reflected in the Common Rule and HIPAA Privacy Rule, have not
persuaded enough people to contribute their data to enable
development of the vast data resources that twenty-first-century
science ultimately will need. Those standards were, after all, minimal
regulatory standards, not designed for the purpose of pleasing the
76. Bethany Spielman, The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining
Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1044, 1056 (1999) (citing J.R.
Bambrough, Plato's Political Analogies, in PLATO, POPPER AND POLITICS 152, 158 (R. Bambrough
ed., 1967)).
77. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Expert Testimony by Ethicists, 76 TEMPLE L. REV. 91, 96-
99, 105-06 (2003).
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public, and they have not done so.78 Why not engage the public in the
challenge of designing a better set of standards that can satisfy
concerns of data contributors, while still making data available for
socially valuable research uses?
Other recent work79 proposed the formation of consumer-driven
data commons, which would be self-governing communities of
individuals, empowered by access to their own data, who work
together to assemble large-scale data resources for research. These
commons are conceptually similar to the "data cooperatives[] that
enable meaningful and continuous roles of the individuals whose data
are at stake" that Effy Vayena and Urs Gasser have proposed for
genomic research,80 to "people-powered" science that aims to construct
communities to widen participation in science,' and to the
"patient-mediated data sharing" described in a recent report on FDA's
proposed medical device safety surveillance system.82
Consumer-driven data commons would, in effect, be
self-governing data commonwealths, formed by consent of the
members-people self-selected because they share at least some
degree of common purpose. These commons could be organized and
operated by the members themselves, by disease advocacy groups, or
by commercial data management companies acting as trustees to
manage members' collective data resources according to rules the
members themselves would set.8 3
Each commons-forming group would establish its own rules of
access to-and use of-its members' shared data resources. Group
members would deliberate and have a voice in setting their privacy
practices as well as the duties and rights of membership in the group,
their policies on entry and exit from the group, and how to operate
their collective decision-making processes. This would not necessarily
lead to adoption of ethical and privacy norms that differ starkly from
today's Common Rule and HIPAA Privacy Rule. A commons-forming
group might decide, after considering alternatives, to embrace norms
78. Evans, supra note 3, at 31.
79. Id. at 29-32.
80. Effy Vayena & Urs Gasser, Between Openness and Privacy in Genomics, 13 PLOS
MED. 1, 1 (2016).
81. Berris Charnley, People Powered Science, CONSTRUCTING SCI. COMMUNITIES (May
14, 2015), https://conscicom.org/2015/05/14/people-powered-science/ [https://perma.cc/6GGW-
FSAB].
82. NAT'L EVALUATION SYS. FOR HEALTH TECH. PLANNING BD., THE NATIONAL
EVALUATION SYSTEM FOR HEALTH TECHNOLOGY (NEST): PRIORITIES FOR EFFECTIVE EARLY
IMPLEMENTATION 27 (2016), https://healthpolicy.duke.edu/sites/default/files/atoms/files
/NEST%20Priorities%20for%2OEffective%2OEarly%2OImplementation%2OSeptember%202016_0.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6QQD-FB7T].
83. Evans, supra note 3, at 29-30.
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similar to those reflected in current regulations. They might,
however, tweak them slightly, for example, by electing members of the
IRB that can grant consent waivers on behalf of their group, and
making these members fireable at the group's discretion. Presumably,
however, if people had been happy with the norms reflected in current
regulations, they already would have contributed their data for
scientific use, which most people have not done. The real value of
consumer-driven data commons is that they offer a laboratory for
modernizing ethical and privacy norms to function in big data
environments. Commons-forming groups would enunciate their
privacy and ethical standards "bottom up"-that is, for
themselves-rather than having standards imposed "top down" by
regulators, external ethics advisory bodies, and IRBs.
Some commons-forming groups might reject traditional
regulatory norms altogether, replacing them with collectively agreed
norms that are more (or less) favorable to research uses of data.
Groups would enunciate their own visions of what constitutes an
ethical use of their members' data. Some groups, to enhance the value
of their collective data resources, might agree to abolish individual
consent and instead make collective decisions about how their entire
data resource-including the data of all members-can be used. The
more inclusive a data resource, the greater its value to science.
No individual would be required to join a commons-forming
group. Individuals wishing to participate would first obtain their own
health data by exercising their HIPAA Section 164.524 access rights,
which allow individuals to obtain a copy of their data held by HIPAA-
regulated healthcare entities. Access to data held by non-HIPAA
entities, such as wearable device manufacturers, is not subject to
uniform national policies and varies depending on the manufacturers'
policies, making it important for commons groups to encourage their
members to do business with pro-access companies.84  Having
obtained their data, individuals could choose to deposit their data in
one or more consumer-driven data commons. Once in, individuals
would give up their right of traditional, granular informed consent to
specific data uses and would instead agree to be governed by whatever
norms the group had agreed. The individual right of consent thus
would be conceived as a right to enter or not enter a specific commons
group-to remain in or exit it in accordance with its rules-and to
participate in the group's collective decision-making processes.
An advantage of consumer-driven data commons is that the
Common Rule and HIPAA Privacy Rule do not restrict individuals'
84. See id. at 23-25 (discussing difficulties in accessing data from mobile and wearable
fitness devices and other non-traditional sources of health data).
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ability to sell their own data. In contrast, institutional data holders
such as hospitals face restrictions, like the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act's
restrictions on sale of data that make it hard to finance the
development of large-scale data resources and to sustain them for
long-term use. Consumer-driven data commons could make collective
decisions about the revenue model they wish to adopt, using proceeds
to retain legal and other consultants to help manage their data assets
and to convert their data resources into consistent formats that
enhance their value and scientific utility. However, the members of
consumer-driven data commons would be free to decide that
commodification of their data is ethically objectionable and instead
donate their data resources for scientific uses chosen through their
collective decision-making processes.
As groups enunciate their respective visions of ethical data
access, there would be a marketplace of ethical and privacy policies.
Individuals could compare these as they make decisions about which
consumer-driven data commons best satisfy their own vision for
ethical use of their data and their own goals concerning how their data
should be used. A successful consumer-driven commons would be one
that attracts members (by enunciating ethical and privacy standards
that satisfy concerns of data contributors) yet is able to supply data for
useful lines of research on terms satisfactory to those members (by
threading the needle of ethically acceptable research data access). As
successful consumer-driven data commons expand, their expansion
would supply empirical data on what works and what does not work in
engaging people in the excitement of twenty-first-century research
and incentivizing them to contribute their data.
VI. CONCLUSION
The transition from twentieth-century small-data bioethics to
twenty-first-century big-data bioethics, in many respects, resembles a
shift from self consciousness to social consciousness. We are now
officially interdependent, and collective action will be required both to
overcome the scientific challenges that lie ahead and to protect our
privacy as we do so. Regulatory frameworks of the past have served
us well and will continue to deliver good service in the contexts for
which they were designed-clinical research and traditional
informational studies. They are not, however, adequate in the context
of modern big data science. In developing new frameworks,
"top-down" approaches of the past should be avoided. The people
whose data are used in research possess expertise of what is ethical
that is as valid as what regulators and ethics "experts" can offer.
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Consumer-driven data commons offer a laboratory in which groups of
consenting individuals can discover the common purposes that they
share and can enunciate ethical and privacy standards that, at last
after six decades of bioethical debate, will be of the people, by the
people, and for the people.

